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1. Introduction 
The field of evolutionary economics has gone from strength to strength for almost four decades 
now, mainly sparked by the seminal books by Kenneth Boulding (1981) and Nelson and Winter 
(1982). However, as Nelson (2020) has pointed out, the advances in this expanding field have been 
virtually ignored in the mainstream of economics and most of the key contributors are now located 
in business schools (Hodgson (2019)). An important reason for this lack of penetration has been the 
fact that the sub-fields of evolutionary economics do not have a shared heuristic, unlike the 
mainstream (Witt (2008)).  But, from the above mentioned seminal contributions onwards, 
Darwinian biological analogy became popular as a ‘meta-heuristic’ (Winter (2014)). However, it 
eventually became accepted that using an analogy from another discipline has its limitations 
(Hodgson (2002)). Instead, Darwinism began to be viewed in a different way.  
Price (1970, 1972) provided a formal representation of an evolutionary process that became central 
in neo-Darwinian models of biological evolution. Metcalfe (1998) and others demonstrated that 
economic evolution can also be expressed in the Price Equation and that this is not just a biological 
analogy. If there is an available market niche and a distribution of fitness (or variety) amongst 
entrants to it, differential growth ensures that the fastest grower will come to dominate.  So, 
Metcalfe (1998) did not see the Price Equation as a representation of evolutionary dynamics that is 
specifically Darwinian. However, it was not long before some evolutionary economists saw it as neo-
Darwinian in character, provided that a replicator/interactor distinction can be made. What was 
previously known as ‘Universal Darwinism’ became known as ‘Generalized Darwinism’ (GD) in 
evolutionary economics. Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) provide a comprehensive treatment.  
Frank (1998) argued that the Price Equation, despite being a tautology, has value in evolutionary 
science, because it can be used to build theoretical models that are genuinely evolutionary in form. 
The neo-Darwinian mechanism, embodied in the GD heuristic, is one of these. Despite the fact that 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) must be applauded for explaining precisely what neo-Darwinism 
means in evolutionary economics, is it the right choice of heuristic for evolutionary economics and, 
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furthermore, is there a role for this kind of heuristic at all, bearing in mind the fact that economics is 
a different kind of science to, for example, physics or biology? Lawson (1997) argued to the contrary 
and, instead, offered the empirically grounded, bottom-up methodology of critical realism which 
does not rely upon a heuristic of this kind but still deals with processes that involve evolutionary 
change. Also, economic historians, such as David (2007), have argued that research in evolutionary 
economics should make the historical path dependence we observe in economic processes the core 
starting point in evolutionary economic research. However, few deny that competition plays a role in 
economic change, but making neo-Darwinian selection the core mechanism in evolutionary 
economic analysis is another matter.  
It will be argued here that the adoption of a GD heuristic by some researchers, despite the very best 
of intentions, was a wrong turn in evolutionary economics because it cannot be connected directly 
to empirical research using historical data and, therefore, cannot offer a methodology for 
undertaking such research. The result has been a tendency towards more fragmentation, rather than 
unification, of the different strands of applied research in evolutionary economics (Robert et al. 
(2017)). For example, a great deal of useful research in evolutionary economics is conducted in the 
field of innovation. Indeed, Winter (2014) contended that the field of evolutionary economics has 
always been centred upon understanding the causes and consequences of technological change.  
Furthermore, innovation research has had a significant impact upon policy in some countries (see, 
for example, Dodgson et al (2011) in the case of Australia). Since innovation is all about the 
generation of variety, GD, with its focus on competitive selection across a given variety set, does not 
seem to be a very useful analytical framework for generating theories and hypotheses to test in the 
related fields of innovation and entrepreneurship. So, over the past decade, there has been an 
increasing separation between theoretical work employing the UD heuristic and empirical studies of 
innovation.  
So, the objective of this essay is, first, to explain that, even though it is fully accepted that 
competition has a role to play in economic evolution, the GD heuristic, when it is relied upon too 
much in trying to understand economic change, can lead to misleading conclusions. In particular, the 
presumption that competitive selection occurs within a fixed market niche, poses a fundamental 
problem (Gatti et al (2020)). Secondly, it will be explained why, instead of an abstract heuristic like 
GD, there is a more urgent need for a grounded heuristic in evolutionary economics that can 
connected to a methodology that can be used, directly, in empirical research in microeconomic 
fields such as innovation and entrepreneurship, and in macroeconomic studies of economic growth 
and development. An actual evolutionary economic process involves the intertwining of non-random 
variety generation, representable as self-organisation, and competitive selection from a given 
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variety set. Both can happen simultaneously in the economic domain, but, it is argued, the former 
offers a better methodological starting point for empirical research in economics since, the 
generation of variety is non-random, to a considerable degree, and cooperation is widespread. 
Competitive selection is clearly central in biological evolution because the variety generated is 
largely random. But, in economics, cooperation and complementarity are inevitable 
accompaniments to the non-random processes of entrepreneurship and innovation and this has 
been repeatedly observed in many different socio-economic contexts. Thus, the degree to which 
competition is important depends upon the systemic context that we are dealing with. 
2. Generalized Darwinism 
Over the past two decades, GD has risen to prominence as a popular heuristic that provides a formal 
representation of an ontology, or ‘way of thinking,’ about economic evolution which portrays 
evolution as the outcome of a competitive struggle for scarce resources (Witt (2008)). Neo-
Darwinism is offered, not just as a biological analogy to be employed in the social sciences, but as a 
theoretical homology capturing, in an abstract way, a general mechanism that is deemed to be 
present wherever, and whenever, evolutionary change is occurring. Two of its main proponents, 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), building upon, for example, Metcalfe (1998) in evolutionary 
economics and a range of contributors to the development of Universal Darwinism in biology 
discussed by Knudsen (2004), argue that all evolutionary processes must exhibit three stages: 
variation, selection and retention, with selection being the key mechanism that enables evolutionary 
change. Although the Price Equation is not a Darwinian construction, but a general equation about 
the evolutionary consequences of differential growth, Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) render it neo-
Darwinian by arguing that the replicator/interaction distinction, accepted widely in biology, can also 
be identified in economic contexts. But, importantly, they do remind us that GD is a heuristic that 
does not provide a methodology directly applicable in applied research using data on a historical 
continuum. Instead, it is seen as an important aid to theoretical construction, and the resultant 
framing of, specific hypotheses concerning evolutionary change in particular times and places.  
The development of the GD heuristic has been very useful because it has clarified what is actually 
meant by neo-Darwinism in evolutionary economics. Confusions have been cleared up. However, 
useful as this heuristic may be in thinking about economic evolution in a broad sense over long 
periods, it can offer little detail about actual history or about the source of variety (Buenstorf (2006), 
Vromen (2019)). In biology it is generally presumed that variety is due to the emergence of random 
mutations in replicators. Although this may be so in biological contexts it is difficult to accept in 
economic contexts (Liagouras (2017)). Presuming randomness in the generation of variety shifts 
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most of the evolutionary action on to competitive selection. But, in economic contexts, the 
generation of variety is not random and the empirical distinction between replicator and interactor 
is very blurred. Take for example, ‘routines’. From Nelson and Winter (1982) on, they tended to be 
viewed as replicators whereas, Metcalfe (1998), argued that they were interactors, with knowledge 
being the replicator. What this suggests is that there is often no clear distinction between replicator 
and interactor in economic systems (Nelson (2006), Levit et al (2011)), therefore, GD is not a general 
heuristic, even though it can be captured in the Price Equation. Also, the variety set is never static in 
economic cases. Typically, a competitive process over a given variety set will be overtaken by further 
changes in variety, due to self-organisation, inducing a historical process that does not have a clear 
competitive conclusion. What we have, instead, is a layered process of self-organisation as new 
market niches emerge and old ones become obsolete (Gatti et al (2020)). 
Now, we know how important core heuristic constructions are in the natural sciences. They connect 
ontologies with empirical methodologies that, if widely adopted, become scientific paradigms. But 
in, for example, physics, the core heuristic is built upon established physical laws, enabling it to have 
a direct connection with hypotheses tested in controlled experiments. In biology, the neo-Darwinian 
heuristic, with its sharp replicator/interactor distinction, is on strong ground because it can be 
connected to the operation of energy seeking dissipative structures confronting the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, placing it on a solid footing to guide research in fields as diverse as palaeontology 
and genetics (Schneider and Sagan (2005), Annila and Salthe (2009)).   
Long ago, economists knew that, to be viewed as scientists, they too, would have to have to be seen 
to have paradigms, backed by heuristic devices representable in mathematics. (Lawson (2019)). So 
economists created heuristic constructions similar in style to those found in 19th Century physics. In 
the post-war era, the favourite in mainstream economics has been neoclassical economic theory 
(NET) and its macroeconomic companion, the theory of general equilibrium (GET). But these 
constitute analogies, not homologies and, therefore, they were not, and could not, provide the basis 
for a scientific paradigm. What emerged were faux-paradigms in microeconomics and 
macroeconomics that were, misleadingly, connected to the pioneering economic ontology of Adam 
Smith (1776).  
There is no prospect of operationalising either NET or GET directly in empirical settings with a 
historical dimension. Some kind of ad hoc bridge is always necessary (slow adjustment and 
expectation delays being favourites). An alternative is to construct a simulation of an abstract model 
derived directly from the neoclassical heuristic and, using a judicious selection of parameters 
(adhockery again), calibration is undertaken. There is an illusion of science at work when, in fact, it is 
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the prior conventional beliefs of the researcher that are pivotal. And, of course, being based upon 
beliefs, neoclassical heuristics have been resistant to contradictory scientific findings emanating, for 
example, from psychology. Ad hoc modifications of assumptions have been made on the fringe, such 
as asymmetric information and incomplete markets, but the unrealistic core beliefs have been 
widely retained. What we see is a lot of scientific looking mathematics which turns out to be, often 
unintendedly, ideological in nature, rather than scientific. 
Turning to GD in economic contexts, there is a strong similarity, in style and intention, to the 
dominant neoclassical heuristic, in the sense that it looks like it provides the basis for a scientific 
paradigm, but it cannot because there is no direct connection to an empirical methodology that can 
be applied in research, using historical information. Instead, a deduced general mechanism, 
specified abstractly, is deemed to be lurking behind the entanglements of economic history. Those, 
such as Witt (2004), who have considered the operation of GD in biological and economic settings 
has not found convincing evidence of a GD homology, although there are other important shared 
features with biology that need to be understood (Cordes (2006)).  So the problem with NET and 
GET, also affects GD – its presumed operation at the core of evolutionary economic processes is a 
product of belief. So it  is vulnerable to exploitation by those promoting ideological view that 
inducing competition is the key to economic progress, despite sound evidence by, for example, 
Ostrom (1990)) that the degree of cooperation seems to be more important.   
But it is not the question of ideological capture that matters here, it is the methodological impact 
that GD has upon evolutionary economic research. It encourages researchers to build their models 
around a presumed core process of competitive selection that is a special case of the Price Equation 
and to seek out aspects of reality that conform to this perspective (Vromen (2012)). If the GD 
mechanism is not, in fact, lurking behind the historical data, then misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations can easily arise. Turning again to the mainstream, the experience of the Global 
Financial Crisis demonstrated, vividly, how basing models upon a dominant abstract heuristic, the 
GET, led to a serious misunderstanding of how the economic system operates with significant social 
costs. And the unwillingness of many economists since to abandon the GET heuristic is further 
evidence that we are dealing with beliefs, not science.  
Generalized Darwinians might well protest that their heuristic abstraction is fundamentally different 
in nature to GET and NET and, indeed, the ontology appealed to is very different. For example, 
Aldrich et al (2008) argued that GD is about non-equilibrium historical processes but, in point of fact, 
the Price Equation, upon which GD is built, has an equilibrium solution that is rather trivial, given 
that it is a tautology. Aside from the defence of GD, the article reads more like a broader defence of 
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the choice of an evolutionary economic perspective on economic history with competition playing 
an important role (Mokyr (1996)). This can only be applauded but, as with GET and NET, the 
abstraction is not in the historical domain and, therefore, is not very useful in empirical research that 
employs historical data. Of course, there will be particular historical periods where the chosen 
abstraction has some explanatory value in conditions that approximate the assumptions made in 
constructing it. ‘Ways of thinking’ are, after all, products of people experiencing actual cases and 
abstracting from them, as Leon Walras did when observing the operation of the Paris Bourse. But, in 
the rough sea of unexplained historical dynamics, a favoured heuristic may turn out to be no more 
than a special case that was, unjustifiably, generalized.  
So the problem with GD in economics is that it belongs to a class of heuristics that that can be 
viewed as unscientific because they are not built upon the underlying operation of an empirically 
established general law (or laws) but rather beliefs based upon observations of particular cases. And 
what is the practical benefit? For example, it is not necessary to invoke the GD heuristic to tell a 
researcher that competition operates in economic evolution, nor do we need GD to tell is that there 
is variety and replication.  A good scientific heuristic tells us more than the obvious, it should enable 
us to discover counter-intuitive understandings that can result in the formulation of novel 
hypotheses that are not obvious. GD doesn’t seem to do this in economic settings, partly because 
the conventions used, and primarily developed in biology, are difficult to define and identify. As 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), admit, use of the replicator/interactor distinction is difficult to 
operationalize (Levit et al (2011)). There is no denying that competition is a process that operates in 
the process of evolutionary change. What matters is what it actually constitutes in socio-economic 
systems. References to struggles for scarce resources, etc., are not enough. 
There is no issue with the Price Equation upon which GD is constructed. The use of tautologies with 
systemic meaning have proven to be useful in theory development in economics, as was the case 
with Harrod’s growth equation, which enabled the development of the radically different growth 
theories of Robert Solow and Nicholas Kaldor, via behavioural hypotheses concerning its 
components. And there is the case of Keynes’ income-expenditure identity upon which the very 
different post-Keynesian, neo-Keynesian and monetarist macroeconomic theories were built, again 
by constructing different hypotheses concerning its components. Tautologies, or identities, 
grounded in the logic of a complex system, are very useful in the pre-scientific phase of examining 
the implications a proposed theory upon the inherent logic of the system under consideration. But, if 
the theory in question is not founded upon an empirically verified law or historical tendency, as was 
the case, for example, with Solow’s theory of economic growth that used the GET heuristic, then we 
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are in the domain of belief, not science. We cannot conduct valid empirical tests emanating from 
such theories.  
So the question arises: can we discover any heuristic that can provide a general analytical framework 
for actual evolutionary economic research?  In trying to answer this question it is useful to go back 
to Alfred Marshall (1890) and remember his warnings about over-using abstract, timeless 
generalisations in economics (Foster (1993)). To him, neoclassical economic theory was a heuristic 
only relevant to research in particular settings and he knew that non-economic factors had also to 
be taken into account.  So, for example, culture and institutions were important for Marshall in 
clarifying the restrictions and opportunities that an economic decision-maker faces. He also knew 
that NET is not very relevant in states of uncertainty where evolutionary processes are operative. 
However, his informal representations of economic evolution were more self-organisational than 
Darwinian (Foster (1993)).  But most neoclassical economists did not build upon his evolutionary 
intuitions and his associated concern with the role the rules embodied in culture and institutions.  
Instead, it was Veblen (1898) and the American Institutionalists who were to stress the importance 
of institutions, and the cultures within which they sit. And Darwinism, as understood in the early 20th 
Century, was used as an analogous way of conceptualising competition that was starkly different 
that adopted in neoclassical economics. But it was not seen as the primary driver of economic 
evolution. It was creativity and cooperation that were central. Later institutionalists, such as John 
Commons, would cease to use the Darwinian analogy at all. For him, culture and institutions were 
not the product of random mutations and the replicator/interactor distinction was not made.  
Institutions and other socioeconomic rules were viewed as deliberative constructions and, therefore, 
endogenous in the economic system. So the conditions for Darwinian natural selection were mostly 
absent. Through the later lens of the Price Equation, the tendency of differential growth to lead to 
dominant rules was primarily self-organisational: what Hayek (1973) was to label as “spontaneous 
order” in the more restrictive neo-Austrian sense. In neo-Darwinian language, interactors devise 
new replicators and these are adopted by other interactors in a historical feedback process that 
contains both cooperative and competitive elements.  
But such a perspective pushed economics towards the study of history and away from looking like a 
conventional science. And institutionalists paid a heavy price for this, losing the influence they had 
on policy in the early 20th Century in the United States. By the 1950s, they were virtually eliminated 
from the mainstream of the economics discipline. So not having a general ‘scientific-looking’ 
heuristic had fatal consequences, even though it had been institutionalists, such as Wesley Mitchell, 
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that were pioneers in economic data collection and applied research in economics with two of their 
number, Simon Kuznets and Gunnar Myrdal, ultimately winning the Nobel Prize.  
3. Economic Self-organisation 
Modern evolutionary economics stems, not so much from the American Institutionalist tradition but 
from that of Joseph Schumpeter (1934). He admired the elegant logic of GET and NET but rejected 
them as very useful in understanding growth and fluctuation in economic systems. He provided an 
evolutionary perspective but, quite deliberately, did not apply a Darwinian analogy. His ontology was 
different: he saw economic evolution as primarily about creativity and cooperation. So he focussed 
upon entrepreneurship and innovation, which we can now identify as an early acknowledgement 
that economic growth is a self-organisational process (Foster (2000)). For him, economic evolution 
was characterised by coherent historical phases of growth of different lengths and intensity. The 
longer upswings were attributed to the actions of entrepreneurs diffusing innovations, with a focus 
upon technological, rather than cultural or institutional, innovations undertaken in states of 
uncertainty. However, Schumpeter’s evolutionary perspective, despite his fame and influence in the 
United States, was ignored by most mainstream economists in the post-war era. He offered no 
heuristic that could compete with the mathematics of NET and GET. Instead, his ontology became of 
interest to researchers in business schools, rather than economics departments, where 
entrepreneurship was of central interest. When we look at the burgeoning literature on 
entrepreneurship and innovation, we see very little evidence that researchers used a Darwinian 
analogy, never mind the GD heuristic.  
If evolutionary economists cannot use an abstract heuristic like GD to do science, because there is 
no direct connection between it and established laws or with the historical data at our disposal, 
where do we go? The answer starts with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, as does modern neo-
Darwinian theory in biology. If we build upon an established physical law, we are on our way to 
providing a heuristic that can yield a scientific paradigm. All economic systems that we observe are 
subject to this law and economic structures within them are built deliberately to negate its 
operation through the absorption of free energy to maintain structure and to do work. So when we 
argue that economic systems behave as dissipative structures, we are not dealing with abstraction, 
but with recurring processes that we can readily observe in real time. Here, were really are dealing 
with a homology across disciplines. 
The dissipative structures that we deal with in economics are of a different kind to those observed in 
physics or biology (Allen (2005), Foster (2005a), Witt (2004)). They involve the deliberate application 
of acquired skills and knowledge in the design, construction and operation of economic structures. 
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Such structure is a product of the imagination, in which an aspirational goal is formed and systems 
are constructed to try to achieve such a goal (Foster (1987)). Whereas biological dissipative 
structures directly seek out energy gradients to exploit, economic dissipative structures try to 
discover knowledge gradients that can enhance their capacity to exploit new energy gradients. This 
involves either the entrepreneurial discovery of innovative new connections between existing 
elements (Kirzner (1997)) in a complex system or new connections with new elements conjured up 
in the imagination (Shackle (1972). This is the process of economic self-organisation, whereby an 
entrepreneur and her team can make an economic structure more complex and larger without 
exogenous intervention (Foster and Metcalfe (2012)).  
Complex systems theory tells us that it is essential for survival that economic structures are ordered 
and, thus, have prior commitments in each time period and, therefore they must exhibit some 
degree of time irreversibility (Arthur (2014), Gillesa et al (2015), Foster (2017), Robert et al (2017), 
Witt (2017)).  But we know that such rule-dependent structure cannot be sustained indefinitely: the 
operation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not always very obvious but this law truly does 
lurk in the shadows. The existence of this law means that all dissipative structures must organise to 
try to nullify it via maintenance, repair and replication. Biological structures rely upon reproduction 
to replicate but economic structures have no strict equivalent to a genome. But they do have a 
founding structure, that is, to some degree, irreversible, that can be decisive in determining life and 
death (Hannan and Carroll (1992)). However, such systems are not fully closed and new knowledge 
gradients are always available to enable some economic structures to survive, not by replicating 
themselves but by adapting their core structure.  
Entrepreneurship results in the emergence of new structure and the adaptive potential of existing 
ones. But this always involves tension because it is the polar opposite of pre-committed, meso-rule-
bound behaviour that is necessary for the structure to function effectively (Dopfer et al (2004)). For 
this reason, much of entrepreneurship that involves radical innovation occurs in emergent, not 
existing, structures. And, because entrepreneurship is mostly conducted in uncertainty, there must 
be a great deal of failure (Lane and Maxfield (2005)). Discovery of exploitable knowledge gradients is 
not easy (Nelson (2016)). Most failure is not because of the operation of competitive selection but 
because entrepreneurial plans turned out to be non-viable. 
In biology, it is argued that random mutations are ‘mistakes’. In other words, the main evolutionary 
story is based upon the emergence of genetic errors. But in the economic case, this is untenable: 
entrepreneurial efforts to develop new products and new technologies are not errors, they are 
deliberative choices. But neither are they rational, in the standard economic sense of the word, 
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because, as noted, they are undertaken in states of uncertainty. Exploration, experimentation and 
inductive tinkering are the kinds of behaviour that homo creativus exhibits as she seeks to achieve 
an aspirational goal (Foster (1987)). Just as we are hard-wired to maintain order in the complex 
economic systems that we inhabit by adhering to meso-rules, so we are hard-wired to search for, 
and enter, new market niches, if the rules permit us to do so. It is this emotional driver that is the 
‘micro-foundation’ of self-organisation, as recognised long ago by, for example, Veblen (1914/2006) 
and Scitovsky (1976) and confirmed in much of modern behavioural economics.  
4. Niches and Scale 
Economic self-organisation offers us a distinctly different heuristic to GD stemming from a different 
ontological view of evolution in economic systems. For economic self-organisation to occur, there 
must be an available market niche to enter (Kauffman (1993), Gatti et al (2020)). What is meant by a 
niche in a complex system is an opportunity for gain through the application of a set of connective 
rules that can be technological, organisational or operational, or some combination. However, there 
is a key difference between biological and economic self-organisation. With the former, niches tend 
to be exogenously available as exploitable connections between existing elements in complex 
systems. With the latter, new connective structures can be created endogenously to attain new 
aspirational goals in uncertainty (Shackle (1972)). So, knowledge gradients are not exogenously 
given, they are created, opening up new market niches. Typically, a business that fully occupies an 
existing market niche has the power to eliminate product or process variations that are viewed as a 
threat. This defence against mutations is also observed in biology. In economic systems, even when 
there is deliberate choice and preparatory research is conducted, we observe many, seemingly 
foolish, attempts by entrepreneurs to enter already full market niches. But this need not be 
irrational. An entrepreneur can imagine that she is actually entering a new market niche, that the 
niche is not full, but growing, or that production costs can be under-cut, under-estimating the 
economies of scale mountain that has to be climbed to be price competitive with existing dominant 
players, even if they are inefficient. Knowledge problems abound in uncertainty. So, be it in a 
biological or economic context, for a mutation to develop and survive, it must find a new niche, or a 
segment of an existing full niche that is open because it is of marginal interest to the dominant 
player(s) because of its low profitability. So it is not competition that results in the emergence of 
variety, it is the avoidance, intentional or otherwise, of competition (Ulanowicz (2009)). 
In an open market niche, an entrepreneur seeks cooperation. She has to create an economic 
organisation as a cooperative network structure in which there is specialist diversity of function. And 
external network connections are forged via contracts. In an open market niche, this is a story of 
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cooperation, both within a growing entity and with other players. Growth is fundamentally 
important because it is static and dynamic economies of scale and scope that are decisive and these 
can be achieved by merger and cooperative agreements. At the same time, the spread of adoption 
of the relevant new rule (or rule set) creates a meso-rule and results in external economies of scale.  
There is a great deal of evidence in the business literature of such processes in open market niches 
(Malerba (2006), Klepper and Malerba (2010)). So economic evolution, and associated growth, 
involves both quantitative and qualitative changes that are both creative and cooperative. Both are 
vitally important. Increasing scale yields reductions in unit costs and qualitative change yields 
improvements in product quality and/or productive efficiency. Both involve creativity of some kind 
with incremental innovations in production and marketing via experimentation and the application 
of skills and knowledge acquired elsewhere.  Of course, luck also plays a role but it is just an ‘error 
term’ in an otherwise non-random process. 
Luck (randomness) is not a primary driver of economic evolution, even though improvements in 
products and processes involve much tinkering rather than planning. All such tinkering is not random 
because it is goal related (or teleological) and it still involves experimentation based upon existing 
non-random skills and knowledge (Ferrer-Cancho et al (2003)). There is an accumulation of 
modifications, built upon previous modifications, directed towards a goal. So it cannot be an optimal 
path to an optimal outcome. Neither is it the other extreme, just competitive selection at work in 
the face of randomness. What matters is scale. Fully in line with the Price Equation, the entrant that 
grows fastest will tend to dominate and, when a market niche is full, it is the scale of the incumbent 
that deters entry, not the intrinsic quality of process or product. And static and dynamic economies 
of scale are facilitated by specialisation, as Adam Smith (1776) pointed out long ago in his pin factory 
example.  But as soon as we concede that scale is critical (Arthur (1994), Young (1928), Knudsen et al 
(2017), Lipsey (2018)), we find that cooperation, collaboration and complementary interactions are 
viable processes to achieve, and share, the fruits of scale economies. And this was understood even 
by early neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshall, who noted that economies of scale would 
mean cooperative mergers and knowledge sharing would occur to get to a dominant situation.  
Now, in the process of entering a new market niche with a new rule set, competition should not play 
much of a role initially because the niche is mostly empty. Creativity and cooperation should be the 
primary drivers. And humans are unusually good at both (Bregman (2020), Hare and Woods (2020)). 
As the market niche fills up, competition should begin to play a more important role. But, even in full 
market niches, we know that it is often the case that oligopolists engage in implicit and explicit 
strategic cooperation in price setting and erecting barriers to entry. So, again, collective avoidance of 
competition is often the priority. This is not in the Darwinian playbook. However, should the market 
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niche shrink for some exogenous reason, we can expect an eruption of battles for survival of the 
kind that Schumpeter discussed, not the smooth diffusion processes that we observe in growth 
phases. Who wins will be very historically contingent and subject to fitness in conflict, not the 
relative fitness of products and/or processes.  
Let us consider entrepreneurial entry into a new market niche, or part of a niche that the existing 
players have neglected or abandoned because it is uneconomic. Scale of production starts small but, 
as it increases, unit costs fall and qualitative change in the product and/or the production and 
marketing processes, also takes place. Expansion in demand is, initially, financed by spending shifts 
from products elsewhere in the economy that have started to become obsolete. The emergence of 
novelty requires there to be a dual of obsolescence somewhere in the economic system that 
facilitates the transfer of expenditure. So, initially, substitution of spending in an adjacent market 
niche can be very small and difficult to spot in a growth context. But, as scale increases, qualitative 
change is also ongoing and economies of scope can result in the creation of a modified product with 
qualities that make it directly competitive in an adjacent full niche. 
For example, Christensen (1997) discussed how, in the USA, small steel mills, with a new set of 
connective rules for manufacturing steel, entered the low grade steel market that US Steel was not 
interested in because of cheap imports. Eventually they improved productivity and quality to such an 
extent that they began to take market share away from US Steel in the higher quality markets. So, 
innovation in small plant production processes initiated a self-organisation process that, ultimately, 
led to a severe decline in the market share of US Steel, the dominant player.  It was not eliminated, it 
adapted to become smaller and more specialised in a more efficient steel industry. But it is over-
simplistic to see this as natural selection in action. The mutation was not random, it arose from the 
fact that entrepreneurship and innovation enabled entry into an adjacent open niche which, in turn, 
enabled further incremental innovations, explicitly designed to challenge the dominant player.  But 
there is no reason why US Steel, which was structurally inert and lacked new knowledge, could not 
have engaged in merger or takeover to internalise the technological shift and neutralise the market 
threat. 
When a business is established in an adjacent market niche and begins to secure market share 
because of product development, it cannot easily be eliminated. A common solution is a negotiated 
merger or takeover so that the increased variety becomes contained within one business. This 
strategy is often the route to survival for an existing firm that cannot easily adapt its structure to 
innovate. Whichever, what we see is the emergence of more specialisation, increases in variety, and 
scale. GD tells us little about this process. It has not occurred due to random variety-generating 
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process but because of the operation of a process involving human imagination, creativity and 
cooperation. Any shift in market share that is observed because of the emergence of competition is 
just a feature of economic self-organisation in a particular meso-rule context.  
GD cannot tell us about this because its logic is about competition within a defined market niche.  
And this has always been a problem in biology - variety only emerges in Darwinian natural selection 
when niches are partitioned. But, with economic self-organisation, the set of market niches is not 
defined because they are created endogenously and, in addition, more market niches can emerge as 
products and processes change qualitatively as self-organisation proceeds. If a large number of new 
market niches open up, these can be complementary, instead of competitive, with existing market 
niches (Gatti et al (2020). So we can have scenarios where existing players lose market share but are 
more than compensated by the growth enjoyed through their entrance to emergent sub-niches. So a 
competitive process in such a case, leads to specialization rather than elimination. There is mutual 
benefit (Dopfer et al (2016)).  
Some new market niches are complementary with existing niches from the start. For example, toll 
roads were novel in the UK in the 19th Century. This new innovation initially involved higher fares for 
passengers but this was more than offset by the benefit of quicker and more comfortable services. 
So, at the time, the emergence of the toll road innovation was entirely complementary with the 
existing horse and carriage transportation niche. Both could access the expenditure that was 
transferred from other goods and services of all kinds. Connective infrastructure has been a 
particularly important innovation that has been complimentary to products in existing market niches 
(Lipsey and Carlaw (2020)). Complexity theory tells us that increasing connectivity between elements 
in a network will always increase value (Witt (2017)).  
The mobile phone is an example of a novel innovation that has expanded the connective 
infrastructure. Whereas, innovation diffusion in the product or process space by businesses is an 
example of micro-self-organisation, this is a macro version that involves mutual benefit (Dopfer et al 
(2016)). Railways, roads, power grids, telephone networks, the postal service, the internet, etc., are 
all examples. Although, these innovations took share from existing businesses, to some degree over 
time, they enhanced many other existing market niches. For example, the internet has rendered 
letters almost obsolete, but it has had a massive complementary effect on parcel services allowing 
postal services to survive and even expand. It is another example of emergent specialisation (or 
variety) and gains in scale and value.  
So, economic self-organisation, via the discovery and exploitation of new niches yields new variety 
via specialisation and scale economies (Saviotti and Pyka (2004)). However, there are some cases 
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where a business in an existing niche is not turned into a specialism but eliminated entirely. This is 
the opposite of the complementarity case and it is the one that GD relates to most closely. An 
example is the replacement of horsepower by the combustion engine in the early 20th century. 
Initially, the application of the combustion engine was only for ‘horseless carriages’ that were only 
bought by the rich as expensive leisure goods. Although they did substitute for horsepower in this 
context, they did not seem a threat to the many industries built around horsepower applications. 
But, as diffusion got underway, the unit cost of the combustion engine and the products they 
powered fell and the range of new applications increased. There came a cost point where a range of 
existing horsepower niches could be entered.  
In the US, the personal transportation crossover was probably the Model T Ford. Not only did it offer 
a novel form of transportation in cities for those who found it not feasible to use horses that had to 
be fed and stabled, but it also replaced existing horse and carriage combinations and did so quite 
rapidly in the early 20th Century. In addition to the advantages of dynamic and static economies of 
scale and scope, the cost of gasoline, relative to pasture and hay, also declined markedly, again 
because of economies of scale in production, distribution and storage. Being much smaller than a 
steam engine, applications were devised that substituted also for labour power, just as the horse 
had done. Some involved entirely new market niches, such as air-travel which, again, did not initially 
threaten long haul passenger sea travel but eventually eliminated it, apart from cruising.  
This case of fossil fuel combustion/horsepower substitution does seem to approximate the GD 
representation of economic evolution. There was little complementarity between the old and new 
technologies and the replicator/interactor distinction was approximated with large effects upon 
existing interactors. Large numbers of people lost their livelihoods with corresponding shortages of 
skilled labour in operating and servicing combustion engine driven products. This seemed to 
contribute significantly to the political upheavals and associated cultural shifts in the early 20th 
Century. Again, we see how the expansion of novelty and obsolescence go hand in hand. And the 
changes were radical: cities were transformed in scale and complexity and agricultural productivity 
increased dramatically contributing to massive rural-urban migrations. By the 1950s, in the US, the 
combustion engine had replaced almost all horsepower applications and opened up many more 
complementary sub-niches, leaving only very specialised horsepower applications in very rough 
terrains and leisure activities. Although GD can be enlightening, in a pedagogic sense, when 
investigating the replacement of certain general purpose technologies (GPTs) (Lipsey et al (2005)), it 
cannot provide a methodology to track how change actually occurred. Even in the case of the rapid 
replacement of horsepower by the combustion engine, the opening up of a host of new market sub-
niches blurred the competitive dynamics that were clearly operative. And it was not a simple story of 
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replacement and dominance. The very core of the economic system was disturbed, precipitating 
conflict between vested interests and the ultimate emergence of modified socio-cultural rules to 
curb such conflict and to facilitate, or suppress, the wide adoption of the new GPT.  
GD cannot tell us about the socio-political upheaval and the economic consequences of such a 
competitive process because it is situation specific. Although what occurred was roughly in line with 
GD thinking over about a half century, it was actually a process that involved  diffusion, 
obsolescence, expanding and contracting niches which GD has little to tell us about.  All GPT 
transitions involve some degree of socio-political disturbance because they involve winners and 
losers. The structural commitment that all complex economic systems must have to be sufficiently 
ordered to function results in political conservatism. And history tells us that such conservatism has 
sometimes won the day with disastrous consequences (Diamond (2005)).  But cooperative 
adaptation and structural transitions without serious socio-political problems have also been 
observed.  
For example, the mobile phone which is, in fact, a computer, camera, phone and a host of other 
things has, as yet, tended not to have fatal impacts on the existing market niches that were entered. 
For example, landlines remain common, cameras and watches have retreated to more specialised 
niches and notebook computers have not been strongly affected by the advancing computing 
capability of mobile phones. And the same story applied, self-organisation, starting with a bulky, 
expensive and unthreatening executive toy, has evolved into a product which has enabled 
specialisation, increased variety and has opened up many new sub-niches. Neo-Darwinian selection 
has not been dominant because the mobile phone did not enter a full niche (landlines), but rather, it 
entered a mobile communications niche that yielded a bewildering expansion of complementary 
sub-niches. This emergence of novelty has been distinctly non-random. What the mobile phone has 
done is attract spending, not just from adjacent niches, but from products all across the economic 
system. So distant trails of obsolescence in spending patterns have diminished sales of established  
products in unexpected places but, along with other computer related innovations, the mobile 
phone has increased the efficiency of production on the margin, releasing human resources to be 
taken up in new sectors, and induced specialisation. So, because of strong complementarities with 
existing technologies, the process of structural change that has not been as traumatic as was the 
case with the combustion engine Instead of catastrophic job losses, it has steadily induced labour 
transfers from, for example, manufacturing to services. Provided that a new GPT permits an old one 




5. The Augmented Logistic Diffusion Methodology 
GD is a heuristic that is built upon an ontology that views change as a competitive struggle. 
Economic self-organisation a heuristic that is built upon a contrasting ontology, that economic 
change is the result of creativity and cooperation. It is built upon solid scientific foundations: the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics and the fact that all living systems, including economic systems 
have to be dissipative structures to survive and develop. Such structures must all access energy 
gradients, however, humans, do this by accessing knowledge gradients, not just by observing the 
world around them, but by constructing new knowledge, via the imagination.  So, economic self-
organisation is the primary driver of economic evolution. Such a heuristic has a solid evidential basis 
in the vast number of case studies of entrepreneurship and innovation. But a heuristic is only of 
scientific value if it can be directly connected to an empirical methodology that can address 
historical data that economic systems generate.    
Any dissipative economic structure grows if there is a knowledge gradient to be exploited and 
growth stops when the gradient has been eliminated and the corresponding niche is full. This is a 
general tendency in the growth phase of a self-organisational process and exhibits itself in some kind 
of sigmoid growth path in historical time (Foster (2005b)). This reflects the fact that self-organisation 
is both self-stabilising and self-amplifying (Foster (2017)). So here we have a general empirical 
prediction about growth in the presence of self-organisation that can be employed in investigations 
of the growth of firms, industries and economies. The economic self-organisation heuristic is not 
grand and philosophical like NET/GET or GD. It is embedded in history and the empirical 
methodology, employing, for example, the logistic or Gompertz function, can only be fitted growth 
phases where entrepreneurship is operative and innovation is diffusing, it does not explain anything 
about the outcomes of the structural transitions that occur when such growth reaches a diffusional 
limit. That is the terrain of political scientists, historians, anthropologists, etc., investigating highly 
situation-specific dynamics, not economists. So the economic self-organisation heuristic must always 
be applied in conjunction with research findings in non-economic disciplines. Complex economic 
systems are structures of rules and these are supported and altered via non-economic processes. 
There are large numbers of studies showing the diffusion of innovation follows a sigmoid growth 
trajectory over time. Many are found to follow logistic or Gompertz curves. The innovation literature 
abounds with examples (Rodgers (2003)).  Metcalfe (2004) goes so far to argue that this observed 
tendency is so pervasive that we can consider it a “logistic law”.  But this methodology is not just for 
nonlinear curve fitting but one for building models that presume the underlying existence of a 
logistic process because of self-organisation. So, there need not be a logistic curve observable in the 
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data under consideration. As such, the presumed underlying logistic process must be augmented by 
a range of relevant variables that are hypothesised to shift the diffusion curve or the limit to which it 
tends. It is here that competition enters the frame. Price competition is the most common form of 
competition in economic systems and price information is straightforward to obtain. In Foster (2017) 
it is shown that there is a special, but very unlikely, case where the growth under examination is only 
about competition. The logistic process can be impacted by a range of other variables, economic and 
non-economic, and the significance of these can be tested using, for example, econometric and 
statistical methods, suitably interpreted (Foster and Wild (1999a, 1999b) and Foster and Potts 
(2009)).  
Although, sigmoid functions have been estimated in a number of studies of growth in various 
contexts, few have connected with the self-organisational heuristic. Indeed, many are not about 
economic self-organisation at all, but, instead, describe quite predictable developmental processes. 
So it is very important that a historical narrative is provided to ensure that a self-organisation 
process is being dealt with. Empirical examples of the application of the augmented logistic diffusion 
methodology by this author at sectoral and macroeconomic levels of inquiry are: Foster and Wild 
(1999a, 1999b), Foster (2014), Foster (2016) and Foster (2020).  
Single firm and product studies of innovation using logistic functions have been much more popular 
in the business strategy and organisational ecology literature but, again, not very often within the 
context of the self-organisational heuristic. For example, Meade and Islam (2006) show that the 
logistic has been popular for a long time in marketing, starting with the pioneering study of Bass 
(1959).  Given all this, it is surprising that the pioneering research of Kuznets (1953), Griliches (1957) 
and Mansfield (1968) in economics, tracking innovation along logistic functions, did not lead to the 
later adoption of the self-organisational heuristic as the centre-piece of evolutionary economics in 
growth contexts of the Schumpeterian kind. 
GD proponents, who tend to be reluctant to emphasise the importance of endogenous variety 
generation, might argue that observed diffusion processes are just competitive selection in action 
leading to dominant features of some kind. But the moment that it is acknowledged that mutation is 
non-random and that the replicator/interactor distinction rarely holds in economic settings, this 
cannot be so. Also, when we look at the Price Equation, and the very similar replicator dynamic 
model, they are mathematical constructions that are not specifically about competition, but about 
the outcome of differential rates of growth. But this can, equally, come about because of growth in 
cooperation to increase scale in an open niche, remembering Frank’s (1995) acknowledgement that 
the Price Equation is really just a useful tautology that can be employed in the development of quite 
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different theoretical approaches. And, as already opined in Foster (2005b), the self-organisation 
heuristic is capable of containing all of strands of evolutionary economics as particular cases, 
including neo-Austrian representations of ‘spontaneous order’.  
6. Conclusion 
Proponents of the application of GD, such as Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), must be commended for 
providing a clearly specified neo-Darwinian heuristic for evolutionary economics. Much confusion 
has been cleared up. However, just as Alfred Marshall rejected the general equilibrium 
representation of neoclassical economic theory as a generally applicable heuristic in empirical 
contexts, so GD can be rejected here on similar grounds. There is a lack of connection with an 
empirically established law and assumptions are adopted that disconnect the heuristic from history. 
Although it is fully accepted that the Price Equation can represent any evolutionary process, GD is a 
special case that fits well in biology where variety is largely random and there is a clear distinction 
between replicators and interactors. So natural selection must dominate in biological evolution. 
Economic evolution is different. Variety generation is a creative process and there is often no clear 
distinction between replicators and interactors. Self-organisational processes involve cooperation to 
fill new niches that are the product on imagination and creativity and, therefore, endogenously 
determined. And increases in cooperation, for example, in the mutual adoption of meso-rules, 
means that the definition of ‘interactor’ keeps changing, as do ‘replicators’ as incremental 
innovations and learning from experience changes them qualitatively.  
Aldrich et al (2008) argue that: “Even if there is not a fierce life-and-death struggle between rival 
customs or institutions, some explanation is required of why some enjoy greater longevity than 
others, why some are imitated more than others, and why some diminish and decline. Any such 
explanation must come under the general rubric of selection.” (P.585). So, for them, all that has 
been discussed here is just “selection,” even though it might involve cooperation in an open niche. 
This is tautological generality. What Metcalfe (1998) refers to as “restless capitalism” is, in fact, 
about the emergence of new knowledge gradients - the generation of new structures and activities 
from imaginings, which are usually in plentiful supply.  The notion that these imaginings, or ideas, 
are naturally selected, as they get taken up in self-organisational processes, is unhelpful. Good ideas 
spread like wildfire and result in eager cooperation to create new structures. Entry into a new niche 
involves differential growth and the domination of one or more meso-rule sets, but to see this as 
natural selection, rather than a process of self-organisation approaching a growth limit, would seem 
to be a contorted vision of economic evolution.  
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Of course, there is no denying that competition is important in economic evolution but its impact 
varies in its strength. As soon we accept that cooperation is important, it is theoretically possible 
that all ‘interactors’ adopt the new rule set, leaving the competitive balance unaffected. However, 
we know that this does not happen because such ‘universal cooperation’ can never exist in a 
complex system. Incomplete knowledge and irreversible commitments to existing rule structures are 
pervasive, preventing universal adaptation and encouraging strategic behaviour. But 
acknowledgement that there exists cooperation in diffusion processes means that the distinction 
between replicators and interactors in a complex economic system is misleading because existing 
interactors can copy new replicators and, in turn, replicators can be improved as interactors adopt 
them. This is self-organisation in action.  
Building a heuristic out of an observed historical tendency operating in complex economic systems is 
a fundamental departure from the theoretical norms usually adhered to in economics. It implies 
that, when dealing with economic growth and associated structural change, science has to be done 
differently.  Except in pre-scientific contemplation, a heuristic should be neither based upon 
abstract, timeless generalisations nor just the inductive examination of data without theoretical 
direction. This can only be done if the chosen heuristic is directly connected with observed historical 
tendencies. The self-organisational heuristic connects with a methodology that can be applied in 
growing contexts. The history that we observe is divided into two distinct categories: phases where 
structural change unfolds in orderly ways that can be impacted by the kinds of incentives that are 
focussed upon in conventional economics, and phases where there is structural turbulence and 
transition where research must involve political scientists, anthropologists, historians, etc. This is 
because of the key importance of meso-rules in complex economic systems (Blind and Pyka (2014)). 
Doing science does not just involve description. Estimating augmented logistic growth models, as 
opposed to just fitting logistic curves, involves testing hypotheses and prediction, based upon 
models that are historical in construction. But the dual presence of historical determinism and 
indeterminism means that growth predictions have to be qualified by the increasing likelihood of 
structural crisis and transition (Foster and Wild (1999b)). As Maynard Keynes famously observed, 
forecasting the weather is of little value when the sea is flat. What logistic modelling can do is warn 
of coming structural inertia and instability. But such modelling does not tell us what policies will be 
necessary to facilitate transition. These tend to be context specific. Again, we have to look to other 
disciplines to ascertain which meso rules are blocking change and what kinds of new policy-driven 
rules can assist a structural transition and protect those damaged by it. So, adoption of the self-
organisation heuristic means that economists can only have a limited role in explaining economic 
evolution and in the development of policies to deal with it. Abstract generalisations, so popular in 
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economics, must be replaced by context specific analysis that is always connected to the findings in 
other disciplines. Many institutional and evolutionary economists have, over the years, tried to do 
this and have often been shunned by conventional economists for doing so. Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2010) recognised this reality, but constructing an alternative abstract heuristic of the ‘general’ kind 
was a step in the wrong direction.  
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